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The UK’s general election in May 2015 refocused
public and political attention on the national
budget deficit and has reinvigorated the public
debate about the need for reductions in public
spending. The Welsh Government has, until
recently, protected its local authorities from the
deep spending cuts imposed in England as a
consequence of the programme of ‘austerity’,
which has been in place in the UK since 2010.
However, continuing pressure on the overall
funds devolved to the Welsh Government has
led to cuts at the local level (3.5% in 2013–14 and
4.5% in 2014–15) and has prompted a debate
about the potential impact on local authority
services. The Welsh Government has thus urged
local authorities to plan reductions in a way
which limits the impact on those who depend
most on their services (BBC News, 2014).
The pressing need for councils to review
costs at every level was highlighted in 2013 by the
Welsh local government shadow minister, who
was reported as saying: ‘Welsh councils need to
go through their budgets line by line and
eliminate wasteful spending, improve their tax
collection rates and deliver services in more
imaginative ways’ (BBC News, 2013).
Welsh public spending amounts to
approximately £30 billion a year (HM Treasury,
2013, p. 114), of which approximately £8 billion
is spent by local authorities. At times of financial
pressure, when managers may face particularly
acute incentives to manage their reported
financial performance in order to access higher
levels of funding or to avoid political costs and
regulatory intervention, the role of audit as an
assurance mechanism for the integrity of the
financial statements is particularly important for
stakeholders. However, expenditure on audit
services is far from immune from pressures for
reductions in spending.
Audit fees for Welsh local authorities are
determined by the Wales Audit Office (WAO),
the regulator of local audits in Wales, mainly
with reference to the size of the local authority.
Since 2010, in response to austerity pressures,
these fees have been reduced by 21.6% in real
terms (WAO, 2014, p. 6). This is, however, much
less than the nominal fee reductions of 40%
which have been experienced as a consequence
of the radical and controversial reform of public
audit in England (Local Audit and Accountability
Act 2014), which has involved the abolition of the
Audit Commission (the English equivalent of the
WAO) and the transfer of audit performance to
private sector audit firms. Such a policy has not
as yet been embraced by the Welsh Government,
and the Auditor General for Wales continues, at
least for the time being, to retain considerable
control over the pricing, quality and execution of
local audit.
Audit fees are, however, not only a function
of audit efficiency and effectiveness, but also of
the quality of the financial statements presented
for audit. Audit adjustments as a consequence of
poor pre-audit financial reporting quality are
costly both in terms of additional auditor effort,
which is likely to impact fees, and in terms of
auditee effort, in negotiating the extent of
adjustments. Improved pre-audit financial
reporting quality thus has the potential to reduce
fees and deliver internal cost savings. Further, in
the distinctive setting of UK local authorities,
which are required to publish pre-audit financial
statements for public scrutiny, increased pre-
audit financial reporting quality may also deliver
other benefits such as an enhanced reputation
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for financial governance and stakeholder
accountability. In this paper we exploit the public
availability of these pre-audit financial statements
to investigate the incidence and scale of audit
adjustments and their association with audit fees
for Welsh local authorities in the period 2005–06
to 2009–10.
Prior research
Research into audit adjustments is limited and
has historically been constrained by data access
issues. Such research requires access either to the
pre-audit financial statements, which are not
normally published, or access to auditor working
papers which are subject to commercial and
client confidentiality. The majority of studies
have therefore exploited special access to the
working papers of one or more audit firms
(Hylas and Ashton, 1982; Kinney and McDaniel,
1989) or have adopted a survey based research
instrument (Kreutzfeldt and Wallace, 1986;
Johnson, 1987; Houghton and Fogarty, 1991;
Bell and Knechel 1994; Wright and Wright,
1997).* Further, these studies have focused
almost exclusively on the private sector in a US
setting. More recently, studies have been
extended to alternative settings, such as Germany
(Ruhnke and Schmidt, 2014), China (Chan et al.,
2003), South Africa (Houghton and Fogarty,
1991) and Norway (Eilifsen and Messier, 2000).
A general finding of these studies is that audit
adjustments serve to reduce reported income
(Kinney and Martin, 1994).
An interesting feature of the not-for-profit
and public sectors is that it is sometimes possible
to access pre-audit financial statements. Grein
and Tate (2011), for example, exploit the
availability of such statements to investigate the
scale and incidence of audit adjustments in US
public housing associations and their impact on
financial reporting quality. Consistent with prior
studies, they find that audit adjustments are
economically significant and that they have an
asymmetry which suggests greater concern with
potential overstatement of performance than
understatement.
Prior UK audit studies in the not-for-profit
and public sectors have so far considered the
determinants of both audit quality (Ballantine et
al., 2008) and audit fees. These latter studies
have been performed in the National Health
Service (Clatworthy et al., 2002, 2008; Basioudis
and Ellwood, 2005a; Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle,
2012, 2015), in universities (Mellet et al., 2007),
in charities (Beattie et al., 2001) and in local
authorities (Giroux and Jones, 2007). To date
however there have been no studies on audit
adjustments in these settings.
We extend this limited literature to consider
the scale and impact of audit adjustments in the
setting of Welsh local authorities where pre-
audit financial statements are publicly available.
The institutional, legal and regulatory setting
The UK local authority setting is characterized
by a number of distinctive features relating to
financial accountability, accounting, and audit.
Local authority financial accountability
UK local authorities are elected bodies with
responsibility for delivering local public services
such as education, transport, cultural and leisure
services and refuse collection. Their main
constraint is the requirement to produce a
balanced budget, in which the current year
expenditure does not exceed revenue from
government and local taxes, plus the balance on
the authority’s general fund (the equivalent of
retained earnings).
The balance on the general fund is
characterized by considerable political and legal
sensitivity. Politically, the general fund represents
a start point for determining how much a local
authority needs to raise in terms of local taxes in
order to support its services. Too low a balance
can point to the need to raise more revenue from
local residents and businesses, while too healthy
a balance can lead to pressure to reduce tax rates.
Further, the provisions of s. 114 of the Local
Government Finance Act 1988, which essentially
freeze any new council expenditure, can be
triggered if the balance on the general fund falls
to a level such that total available resources fall
short of expenditure.
A distinctive feature of this local authority
setting is the requirement to publish financial
statements presented for audit (Public Audit
[Wales] Act, 2004, s. 30; National Assembly for
Wales, 2005) so that the public and councillors
may raise any issues of concern with the auditor.
This rare feature of the local authority setting
permits an investigation of audit adjustments
and their impact on audit fees.
Local authority financial accounting and audit
The content of Welsh local authority financial
statements is set out in the Accounts and Audit
(Wales) Regulations 2005 and the Code of Practice
on Local Authority Accounting in the United
*Although ISA 260 requires auditors to disclose audit
adjustments to those charged with governance, it was
not in effect at the time of these studies. As a consequence
of the publication of ISA 260, the auditor’s
communication to those in governance represents an
additional potential source of research data but, in the
case of the private sector, remains subject to commercial
and client confidentiality.
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Kingdom (National Assembly for Wales, 2005,
para. 10). Consistent with a wider programme of
public sector reform, which draws its inspiration
from managerial best practice in the private
sector (Hood, 1991, 1995), these financial
statements have increasingly adopted private
sector accounting norms with the adoption of
UK Generally Accepted Accounting Practice
(GAAP) and, from 2010–11, International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). However,
the adoption of private sector accounting
standards has been subject to much critical
comment on the basis that such accounting
practices were developed in a private sector
context and do not therefore adequately reflect
the distinctive institutional and regulatory
features of the public sector setting where services
are often in the nature of public goods and
cannot easily be traded in markets (Ellwood,
2009), where capital is largely obtained from the
public purse and not from private investors, and
where service delivery is the primary objective
rather than profit generation (Ellwood, 2003;
Barton, 2004, 2005; Ellwood and Newbury,
2006). The income of local authorities, for
example, is largely derived from government
grant funding, some of which is earmarked for
specific purposes. As a consequence, elements of
the surplus/deficit are transferred, under
statutory requirement, to other reserves.
Examples include depreciation, impairment of
fixed assets, and net gains/losses on the sale of
fixed assets. The result is that the surplus/deficit
recorded in the income and expenditure account,
which in other settings is a primary focus for
performance measurement and evaluation, is
not the balance which is transferred to the general
fund, the equivalent of retained earnings in the
private sector. Only after these reserve transfers
have been effected is the remaining surplus/
deficit transferred to the general fund. An
illustration is shown in figure 1: this shows how
the Cardiff City Council’s 2007 deficit on the
income and expenditure account of -£49,382k is
transformed by transfers of certain classes of
income and expenditure to other reserves. The
largest transfer was that of depreciation and
impairment of fixed assets which totalled
£67,577k. The culmination of these transfers
results in a final direct transfer of only -£325k to
the general fund. As a consequence, the meaning
of the reported surplus is more ambiguous
than in other sectors and given the sensitivity
associated with the balance on the general
fund we predict that audit fees will be more
sensitive to adjustments to the general fund
than to the reported surplus/deficit.
Since 2005, the appointment of auditors, the
determination of audit fees and the monitoring
of audit quality for Welsh local authorities have
been regulated by the WAO. Fees are largely
determined by reference to an authority’s gross
expenditure but some flexibility is applied in
order to reflect local factors such as variations in
the quality of the financial statements presented
for audit (see, for example, WAO, 2007). We can
therefore expect that local authorities with a
higher incidence of audit adjustments will
experience higher audit fees.
The Auditor General for Wales has overall
responsibility for the WAO and has a duty to
appoint local government external auditors and
to ensure quality and standards are upheld
(Public Audit [Wales] Act 2004, s. 14). For each
audit there is a named engagement lead who is
responsible for the performance of the audit and
for making a recommendation to the appointed
auditor, who is a member of the WAO, for his or
her consideration and decision as to the form of
audit report which should be issued.
Approximately 60% of audits are performed by
the staff of the WAO, with the remaining 40%
being performed by approved private sector
firms.
The investigation
In this study we investigated the scale and
incidence of audit adjustments and their
association with audit fees. Using pre- and post-
audit financial statements, we measured the size
of audit adjustments as being the percentage
change between the pre- and post-audit financial
statements on three potentially sensitive balances:
•The surplus/deficit on the income statement
because this is the headline figure representing
the focus for press and public comment.
•The transfer to the general fund from the
income statement because this represents an
indication of an increasing or decreasing risk
to a rise in council tax.
•The balance on the general fund, which is an
indicator of the overall health of the local
authority and a measure of the risk of a rise in
council tax.
These measures are summarized in figure 2.
Adjustments to asset figures, although they can
Figure 1. The balance on the income and expenditure account
and the transfer to the general fund.
(£000)
Surplus/(deficit) per the income and expenditure account (49,382)
Balances statutorily transferred to other reserves 49,057
Balance transferred to the general fund (325)
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be material, do not have the same level of political
sensitivity or impact on the general fund (as
discussed previously). However, our measures
did capture the extent to which adjustments to
asset values flow through to the income statement
and general fund.
In the local authority setting, audit fees are
determined, in the first instance, by reference to
their service expenditure. A plot (available from
the authors) confirmed the linear relationship
between total service expenditure and audit
fees, with the exception of two outlier observations
where the audit fees were significantly above
trend because of accounting anomalies and an
investigation into members’ expenses. We
therefore adopted audit fees as a percentage of
total service expenditure as our variable of
interest.
Data and sample
The period of our investigation was from 2005–
06 up to 2009–10, just prior to the introduction
of IFRS. This period was selected to avoid
potential distortions in audit fees and pre-audit
financial reporting quality during the period of
transition, which could arise for both the auditor
and the auditee as a consequence of the need for
familiarization with the new regime (De George
et al., 2013).
There are 22 Welsh local authorities, so for
our five-year study period the maximum number
of observations was 110. We omitted the two
outlier observations from this total. One further
observation was unavailable, failing a response
from the local authority, resulting in a final
sample size of 107 observations.
Data on audit fees and audit adjustments
were sourced manually from the post-audit and
pre-audit financial statements for the period
2005–06 to 2009–10. These were accessed from
local authority websites or by direct request.
Findings
Table 1 shows that the mean expenditure for
Welsh local authorities was £379 million, with a
variation ranging from a minimum of £164
million to a maximum of £1.4 billion. Audit fees
represented a small percentage of this, with a
mean fee of £250,000, ranging from £128,000 to
£463,000. The general fund had a mean value of
£8.6 million, representing 2.3% of total service
expenditure which is consistent with a wish to
fully utilize funds while not exposing the authority
to undue risk. However, this contrasts with the
mean surplus/deficit which amounted to a deficit
of £38 million, representing over 10% of service
expenditure. These two apparently conflicting
figures can be reconciled by reference to the
distinctive features of local authority financial
statements and, in particular, the disconnect
between the reported surplus/deficit and the
amount of funds transferred to the general fund.
Table 1 further shows that the mean transfer to
the general fund was positive (in contrast to the
headline deficit) and increased the balance on
the general fund by a mean value of £220,000.
The difference between the mean reported deficit
of £38 million and the mean transfer to the
general fund of £220,000 is indicative of the scale
of the balances which are statutorily transferred
to other reserves.
The incidence of audit adjustments was
widespread with adjustments to the reported
surplus/deficit in 92 out of 107 (86%) observations,
to the transfer to the general fund in 46 (43%)
instances, and to the balance on the general fund
in 48 (45%) cases. The mean absolute value of
these adjustments was also substantial: the mean
adjustment to the general fund amounted to an
absolute value of £591,000 (representing 7% of
the mean balance on the general fund), and the
mean adjustment to the amount transferred to
the general fund was £525,000 (almost double
the mean transfer value of £220,000). The scale
and number of these adjustments is a reflection
of the political sensitivity of the general fund and
an indication of the extent of auditor scrutiny of
these balances. The mean adjustment to the
surplus/deficit was also substantial at £11 million,
as compared with the reported mean deficit of
£38 million, but this was skewed by an outlier
maximum of £387 million. The median therefore
probably provides a more representative figure
of £2 million, representing an adjustment of just
over 5%. These figures demonstrate the scale
and scope of audit adjustments. Almost all of the
Figure 2. Measures of pre-audit financial reporting quality.
Measure Abbreviation Definition
% adjustment to the reported DSD% Audited SD - unaudited SD x 100%/
surplus/deficit (SD) unaudited SD
% adjustment to the transfer from the DSGF% Audited transfer - unaudited transfer x 100%/
income statement to the general fund (GF) unaudited transfer
% adjustment to the general fund DGF% Audited GF - unaudited GF x 100%/
unaudited GF
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adjustments to the general fund were made
through the income statement in the form of a
‘transfer to the general fund’ (46 out of 48
adjustments), providing further evidence of the
significance of this balance. The adjustments to
the surplus/deficit, at a median value of £2 million,
had a much higher absolute value than that of
both the adjustments to the transfer to the general
fund (mean £220,000) and the general fund
itself (£591,000), indicating that adjustments also
affect other reserve balances in addition to the
general fund. The outlier adjustment of £387
million to the reported surplus/deficit
represented an adjustment concerning a
regulatory change in valuation method of council
dwellings which was not reflected in the pre-
audit financial statements. Post-audit, the assets
were impaired by £431 million, representing a
significant portion of the net adjustment of £387
million. This impairment charge was statutorily
transferred to an alternative reserve, the capital
adjustment account resulting in a nil impact on
the general fund.
The incidence and size of adjustments
processed for each local authority during the
period 2005–06 to 2009–10 varied considerably.
Table 2 shows that out of 92 observed adjustments
to the reported surplus, each authority
experienced an audit adjustment in at least three
of the five years of the study with the percentage
adjustment to the original balance ranging from
6% to 172%. However, in contrast, for four local
authorities these did not translate into any
adjustments to the general fund. Further,
although adjustments to the general fund transfer
appear large, with a maximum (mean) value of
228% (65%), they translate into a maximum
(mean) adjustment to the general fund of 12.5%
(5.3%).
To identify the economic significance of the
relationship between audit fees and audit
adjustments, we tested whether the audit fees
of those local authorities with adjustments
were significantly different from those without
adjustments. Table 3 shows the mean audit
fees as a % of total service expenditure for local
authorities who experienced an audit
adjustment compared with those who had no
adjustment. This table shows that the mean
audit fee for those local authorities with an
adjustment to their general fund was
significantly different (at 1% significance) from
those that had no adjustment. The difference
amounted to 0.012% of total service
expenditure which, for a local authority with
mean expenditure of £379 million, is
approximately £45,000. The situation was
similar for local authorities with an adjustment
to the amount transferred from the income
statement to the general fund (5% significance).
The difference here was 0.01% of service
expenditure, which resulted in an estimated
£38,000 difference in fees for an average-sized
local authority.
In contrast, however, there was no evidence
that adjustments to the surplus/deficit are
significantly associated with audit fees.
However, this could be a consequence of the
high incidence of adjustments to the reported
surplus which severely reduces the number of
comparator observations with no adjustments.
Finally, table 4 shows the direction of audit
adjustments. Although there was little
difference in the number and size of income-
increasing and income-decreasing adjustments
to the reported surplus/deficit, the number of
downward adjustments to the general fund
transfer and to the general fund balance
exceeded the number of upward adjustments.
Overall, a mean reduction of 29% in the general
fund transfer translates into a mean reduction
in the general fund of 2%.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for local authorities in Wales 2005–06 to 2009–10.
Units N Mean SD Min. Max. Median
Total service expenditure (TSE) £’000 107  378,942  197,594  164,401  1,375,509  329,940
Audit fee £’000 107  250  71  128  463  227
Audit fee as % of TSE % 107  0.075  0.027  0.029  0.150  0.066
Reported surplus/(deficit) £’000 107 (38,372)  78,320 (541,628)  7,910 (15,876)
Transfer to the general fund £’000 107  220  1,839 (7,071)  6,052  65
Reported balance on the general fund £’000 107  8,600  4,491  2,377  25,796  7,942
Audit adjustments:
Absolute change of the surplus/deficit £’000 92  11,319  42,737  2  387,538  2,092
Absolute change as % of original value % 92  46.367  99.838  0.013  691.235  13.169
Absolute change of the transfer £’000 46  525  880  16  4,956  268
Absolute change as % of original value % 46  65.374  83.883  2.162  332.143  32.558
Absolute change of the general fund £’000 48  591  983  1  4,956  203
Absolute change as % of original value % 48  5.308  7.256  0.010  41.457  2.973
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Discussion and conclusions
This paper exploits the availability of pre-
audit financial statements in UK local
government to investigate the scale and
incidence of audit adjustments in Welsh local
authorities and their impact on audit fees.
Using both pre- and post- audit financial
statements, we measure audit adjustments as
the % change in the balances on three
potentially sensitive balances: the reported
surplus, the transfer to the general fund and
the general fund balance.
Adjustments to the general fund, the
balance on which is both politically and legally
sensitive, represented a significant proportion
(approximately half) of all adjustments to the
income statement; audit fees were sensitive to
adjustments to the general fund but not to the
income statement; and there was considerable
variation in the scale and incidence of audit
adjustments between local authorities. Finally,
we found that audit adjustments suggested a
more conservative reporting of the surplus/
deficit and of the general fund balance. These
findings are consistent with the direction of
audit effort towards balances with political and
regulatory sensitivity and therefore of
enhanced audit risk. The variation in audit
adjustments between local authorities suggests
that institutional specific factors, such as the
quality of the finance function, may be
important in determining the quality of the
financial statements presented for audit. This
represents an area of possible further research.
This study is the first of its kind to be
conducted in Wales, where the public audit
regime is increasingly divergent from that in
England. Wales has so far eschewed the radical
reforms which are being implemented in
England and which have delivered up to 40%
reductions in the audit fees of local authorities
and other local public bodies. The austerity-
driven reductions in Welsh audit fees have
been much lower and so the imperative to
generate savings through local management
action is more pressing. One such source of
savings is through the improvement of pre-
audit financial reporting quality by taking
action to avoid costly audit adjustments. For a
local authority with mean service expenditure
of £379 million, the effect of an audit adjustment
to the general fund during the period of this
study is estimated to be approximately £45,000,
18% of the mean audit fee of £250,000. Given
that our study was conducted in the five year
period up to 2009–10, fees since that time will
have been subject to austerity-driven
downward pressures on the one hand and to
upward pressures on the other arising from
both inflation and from the increased
complexity of IFRS reporting. Our findings
overall, however, suggest that an improvement
Table 2. Analysis of audit adjustments by local authority.
Adjustments to:
Income statement Transfer to general fund General fund balance
Local No. of No. of Mean % No. of Mean % No. of Mean %
authority observations adjustments adjustments adjustments adjustments adjustments adjustments
1 5 3 75.77 1 200.00 0 0
2 5 3 15.04 1 11.31 1 1.22
3 5 3 17.22 2 25.89 2 6.07
4 4 4 46.67 4 139.35 4 9.36
5 4 4 86.82 1 227.95 1 5.99
6 4 4 20.22 2 16.54 2 1.70
7 5 4 60.89 0 0 0 0
8 5 4 28.05 3 28.16 3 3.19
9 5 4 24.26 1 12.35 3 12.47
10 5 4 69.01 1 2.30 1 0.28
11 5 4 46.56 3 29.39 4 12.11
12 5 4 36.57 4 63.75 4 2.38
13 5 4 32.84 0 0 0 0
14 5 4 14.54 0 0 0 0
15 5 4 6.40 2 19.96 2 3.43
16 5 5 20.40 3 75.55 3 2.40
17 5 5 29.58 5 61.94 5 7.68
18 5 5 15.70 2 4.91 2 0.48
19 5 5 113.55 5 90.20 5 3.90
20 5 5 171.91 2 8.21 2 4.31
21 5 5 47.85 1 210.50 1 1.37
22 5 5 11.09 3 73.13 3 2.15
Total 107 92 46.37 46 65.37 48 5.31
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in pre-audit financial reporting quality in those
local authorities experiencing audit
adjustments could release significant
reductions in the audit fee.
Further, although these cost savings are
low in comparison both with the savings
achieved through the reform of public audit in
England and with the overall austerity related
savings required from local authorities by
central government, they have a symbolic
significance which goes beyond their scale. All
budget holders, but perhaps especially
overhead departments, need to demonstrate a
commitment to making a contribution to
overall savings and to delivering services more
efficiently and effectively. Moreover, in the
case of audit, there are other potential benefits
from a reduction in differences between the
pre- and post-audit financial statements, such
as increased stakeholder confidence in financial
governance. Finally, these findings provide
evidence of potential interest to the WAO, the
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and
Accountancy (CIPFA) and the Welsh Local
Government Association, each of which has a
role in advising and supporting local authorities
on best practice in relation to the quality of
their internal financial reporting.
Finally, while the extent of the analysis in
this study was constrained by the number of
local authorities in Wales, the findings provide
sufficiently interesting and novel insights to
indicate the potential value of further research.
Such research might for example, explore the
significance of pre-audit financial reporting
quality, in other, larger audit jurisdictions
such as that in England and could be extended
to include considerations of timeliness and
streamlining of the financial statements, topics
which have recently been of interest to HM
Treasury (2014) and to the profession (PwC,
2010). Of further interest also would be the
influence of IFRS adoption on audit fees in
local authorities. Our small sample, and the
limited period since IFRS adoption in local
authorities, precluded such an investigation in
the context of this paper. The literature
investigating the impact of IFRS adoption in
the private sector finds that audit fees increase
post-IFRS adoption (De George et al., 2013;
Kim et al., 2012), but such an investigation has
not yet been conducted in a public sector
setting where both the financial reporting and
the audit regulatory regimes feature distinctive
differences compared with the private sector.
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Table 3. Mean audit fees of local authorities with audit adjustments compared with those with
no adjustments.
Income statement Transfer from the income General fund
surplus/deficit statement to the general fund
Indicator Incidence Audit fees Incidence Audit fees Incidence Audit fees as
as % TSE as % TSE % TSE
No change 0 15 0.082 61 0.071 59 0.069
Change 1 92 0.073 46 0.081 48 0.081
Difference 0.009  0.010*  0.012**
*Significant at the 5% level; **significant at the 1% level; TSE = total service expenditure.
Table 4. Analysis of the direction of adjustments to the statement of accounts.
Income statement Transfer from the income General fund
surplus/deficit statement to the general fund
Direction Incidence Mean Incidence  Mean Incidence Mean
of adjustment % change % change % change
Increase 47 43.42 16 52.27 17 4.30
Decrease 45 -49.44 30 -72.37 31 -5.86
All 92 -2.00 46 -29.02 48 -2.26
Note: Adjustments reported in previous tables are absolute values but here we are presenting directional values.
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